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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Non-compete agreements can be traced back to British courts of 
equity that sought to balance an employer’s interest in protecting his 
investment in an employee against an employee’s interest in career 
mobility.1  As employment conditions changed over time, the laws 
governing these covenants evolved to sustain this balance.  Yet, Oregon’s 
new law, which mandates an employer’s compliance with complicated2 
requirements for the enforcement of non-compete agreements in the 
broadcasting industry, advances neither this traditional goal nor an 
innovative set of objectives.  Rather, legislative history reveals the 
complexity of the statute is attributable to a legislature’s unsuccessful 
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Pennsylvania.  Because much of the story behind the Oregon law was not covered by the 
press, my research would have been far from complete without the candid and balanced 
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Monahan, Seth Row, Thomas Carpenter, and Senator Rick Metsger.  Thank you as well to 
the Journal of Business Law for helping me meet its exacting standards of quality.  Thank 
you to my family:  my loving parents Marge and Aaron Rassas who taught me by example 
the value of a principled professional and personal life; and my sisters and their families, 
Stacey and Jeff Klinge, and Jessica, Eric, Danica, and Jamie Rosenbloom, whose unyielding 
support has been invaluable.  Finally, I must thank one individual in particular, my sister 
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 1. Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest:  An Analysis of 
the Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media 
Employees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073, 1078-79 (2007). 
 2. M. Scott McDonald & Jacqueline C. Johnson, Across the Board:  Changes are in 
the Works for Noncompete Agreements, INSIGHT 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/17022.pdf (aptly entitling its 
explanation of the Oregon law Oregon Takes a Hard (and More Complex) Stance on 
Noncompetes). 
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attempt to accommodate inconsistent goals of various political players:  
state senators, the technology industry, broadcasting employers represented 
in part by the Oregon Association of Broadcasters (OAB), and Oregon 
broadcasters represented in part by the American Federation of Television 
and Radio Artists (AFTRA).3  While policy goals are the basis for these 
equitable agreements, the conundrum is that this law does not adequately 
further any such goals.  As a result, employers will now craft non-
competition agreements to comply with the law, but their compliance will 
inadequately balance the interests of broadcasting employers and 
employees.  A return to the common law tradition, however, would redress 
this problem. 
To demonstrate that this law does not comport with any set of policy 
objectives, this Comment first explains the traditional goals of non-
compete agreements by tracking their history from English common law to 
American common and statutory law.  An explanation of legislative 
history, demonstrating the lack of a new set of policy objectives, follows.  
This explanation includes descriptions of the previous legal regime and 
Oregon’s political atmosphere, the publicized version of the law’s 
implementation, events not covered by the press, and the major players 
involved in the law’s codification.4  The Comment concludes by exploring 
the potential effects and shortcomings of the law vis-à-vis the broadcasting 
industry. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
A.  The Birth of Non-Compete Agreements in England 
Non-compete agreements originated in England,5 where they were 
born out of a need to balance the interests of masters and their apprentices.6  
This employment relationship was intended to be mutually beneficial:  a 
master of a trade invested time and effort in training his apprentice7 and the 
 3. Telephone Interview with James Dominic Monahan, Managing Partner, Luvaas 
Cobb P.C., in Eugene, Or., General Counsel, the Oregon Association of Broadcasters (Jan. 
3, 2008) [hereinafter Monahan] (noting that there were so many interests involved in the 
formation of the law that this case demonstrated that there are “two things you never want to 
see made:  law and sausage”). 
 4. An examination of legislative history is difficult here because legislative records are 
incomplete and the narratives of participants in the political process are occasionally 
inconsistent with both each other and the record.  Rather than create a fiction of legislative 
history by synthesis, I attempt to ensure the integrity of this Comment by explaining the 
legislative history through the record, and then through the lenses of political participants. 
 5. William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship:  Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in 
High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 28 (2001). 
 6. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1078-79. 
 7. Id. 
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apprentice provided services of the trade for his master in return for his 
education.  In practice, however, this dynamic was fundamentally flawed.  
As soon as an apprentice learned the trade secrets developed by a master, 
he could leave his master, establish a competing business or work for a 
competitor, and use these secrets to run his former master into financial 
ruin.  As a result, the masters began to issue covenants precluding an 
apprentice from directly competing with them.8 
In time, English common law developed other restraints on employee 
mobility.  For instance, employees had to complete their work or risk 
criminal prosecution.9  These contracts placed a heavy burden on 
employees who, due to a lack of “inter-craft mobility,”10 virtually became 
indentured servants of their employer. 
English courts soon reined in the scope of the agreements, thereby 
restoring the balance between the interests of the employee and employer.  
For instance, in 1711, English courts began to distinguish between and 
enforce only some types of restraints:  namely, an employer could only 
enforce a reasonable limitation.11 
B.  The Development of Non-Compete Laws in America 
American common law initially adopted the reasonableness test first 
developed in England.12  As social norms and attitudes changed, so too did 
the law governing the employment relationship. 
With the onset of the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery, the acceptability of indentured 
servitude faded and judicial reluctance to enforce these covenants grew.13  
Soon, employees were freed from some of the traditional restrictions on 
their mobility.14  “Still, the last vestiges of these [relatively extreme] laws 
did not disappear until the Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in Pollock v. 
Williams, which struck down labor contract statutes that criminalized 
employee fraud in failing to start work or in quitting before an agreed 
term’s end.”15 
While non-compete agreements survived these cultural and legal 
shifts, courts have been uncertain as to how the common law should change 
 8. Id. 
 9. Schaller, supra note 5; Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1080. 
 10. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1080. 
 11. Id. at 1081-82. 
 12. Id. at 1082. 
 13. Schaller, supra note 5, at 28; see also Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 
402 (N.Y. 1981). 
 14. Schaller, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 prohibited a 
state from criminalizing nonperformance of an employment contract). 
 15. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
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to reflect new norms.16  Consequently, court opinions, although aggregately 
institutionalizing at-will employment, have “followed a relatively random 
path and offered differing rationales.”17 
As Kathryn J. Yates contends, judicial confusion may be partially 
attributable to the fact that multiple bodies of law impact these covenants.18  
For instance, a court may focus on the fact that a non-compete agreement is 
a restraint of trade.19  Then, the court will either adopt a reasonableness test 
or analyze the covenant’s “at-will nature.”20  Because non-compete 
agreements are written in contract form, they are subject to contract law 
and require adequate consideration.21  However, they are also based upon 
the more stringent law of equity, as employers often seek injunctive 
relief.22  A court of equity may be more concerned with the over-arching 
fairness of its d 23
C.  Non-Compete Laws Today 
Currently, the consensus is that non-compete agreements are subject 
to a reasonableness test.24  Specifically, these agreements must be:  “(1) 
ancillary to a valid existing employment contract or, alternatively, 
separately supported by adequate consideration; (2) specific as to time and 
territory; (3) necessary for protection of the employer’s legitimate business 
interests; and (4) neither unduly harsh toward the employee nor injurious to 
the public.”25  Litigation arises when an employer seeks to enforce a 
covenant or an employee seeks to escape one.  Each component of the 
reasonableness test serves to balance the employer’s interest in protecting 
his investment in an employee with the employee’s interest in an ongoing 
 16. Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete In A Knowledge Economy:  
Balancing Innovation From Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human 
Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 295 (2006) (“While the corporate 
world has been forced to adjust to (or perhaps embrace) the new employment dynamic of 
highly skilled, mobile workers, the law has been slow to develop any overarching rules to 
regulate changing aspects of the employment relationship.”) (footnote omitted). 
 17. Schaller, supra note 5, at 29. 
 18. Kathryn J. Yates, Comment, Consideration for Employee Noncompetition 
Covenants in Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1986). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1126 (citing the former Oregon law as an example of a limitation on 
restrictive covenants). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1126-27. 
 23. Id.  Alternatively, Courts now may use “negative enforcement,” which also requires 
that the services rendered to the competitor are “unique or extraordinary”; and, because of 
the unique nature of these services, an unenforced restrictive covenant will result in 
irreparable harm to the employer.  Am. Broad. Cos., 420 N.E.2d at 402-03. 
 24. Yates, supra note 18, at 1125. 
 25. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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career.26 
The first requirement addresses “a concern for the average individual 
employee who as a result of his unequal bargaining power may be found in 
oppressive circumstances.”27  If the covenant is included in an initial 
employment contract, the employee can either refuse to work for an 
employer requiring this contract and/or negotiate other employee benefits 
in exchange for acquiescence to this agreement.  If the employee is already 
working when presented with the covenant, he trades any future 
infringement on his career opportunities for fair consideration.28 
In some jurisdictions, continued employment is sufficient 
consideration, especially if there is “the possibility that the employee would 
otherwise have been discharged, the employee was actually employed for a 
substantial time after executing the contract, or the employee received 
additional compensation or training or was given confidential information 
after he signed the agreement.”29  In other jurisdictions, the employee must 
receive significant consideration in order to avoid “a danger that [these 
agreements are used where] an employer does not need protection for his 
investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose barriers to prevent 
an employee from securing a better job elsewhere.”30 
As with common law, the scope of the contract must be reasonable as 
to time and place.  This requirement provides safeguards to an employee in 
that an employer must “prove the social utility of what [is a reasonable 
restriction] . . . [and] permit judicial redrafting in the event the employer is 
unsuccessful in doing so.”31 
 26. See Boisen v. Peterson Flying Serv., Inc., 383 N.W. 2d 29, 35 (Neb. 1986) (“A 
covenant not to compete, as a partial restraint of trade, is available to prevent unfair 
competition by a former employee but is not available to shield an employer against 
ordinary competition.”). 
 27. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W. 2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965). 
 28. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts And Worker Mobility:  
The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 963, 969-73 (2006) (noting that the reasonableness test rests on the assumption 
that the employee can bargain with the employer). 
 29. Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W. 2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980) 
(citation omitted). 
 30. Id. (citation omitted); see also Bennett, 134 N.W. 2d at 899 (“I[t] may well be 
surmised that such a covenant finds its way into an employment contract not so much to 
protect the business as to needlessly fetter the employee, and prevent him from seeking to 
better his condition by securing employment with competing concerns.  One who has 
nothing but his labor to sell, and is in urgent need of selling that, cannot well afford to raise 
any objection to any of the terms in the contract of employment offered him, so long as 
wages are acceptable.”) (quoting Menter Co. v. Brock, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (Minn. 1920)); 
Boisen, 383 N.W. 2d at 34 (“‘[p]ost employment restraints are scrutinized with particular 
care,’ and ‘[a] line must be drawn between the general skills and knowledge of the trade and 
information that is peculiar to the employer’s business.’”) (citation omitted). 
 31. Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 969 (footnote omitted). 
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Practically speaking, the reasonableness test is meant to ensure that 
the employee’s decision to quit his job is not between unemployment or 
another occupation (if the restricted area is so large as to make him 
constructively unemployed, e.g., a non-compete that covers the entire 
continent), a move outside the restricted area, or continued employment in 
an unsatisfying job.32  Instead, the employee chooses between the 
inconvenience of finding a job outside of an area that is in direct 
competition with the employer or staying with the current employer.  Since 
the employee had the opportunity to bargain at the time of the 
commencement of employment for the receipt of fair consideration, he has, 
in theory, already bargained for compensation for any inconvenience 
caused by the foregone opportunity.33 
The agreement also must serve a legitimate business interest; ensuring 
employee mobility is impaired only for a legitimate reason.34  Finally, 
because non-compete agreements originate in the law of equity, there is a 
test for fairness.  This serves as a catchall provision that permits the court 
to be flexible to case-specific facts.35 
III.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A.  The Previous Oregon Non-Compete Law 
The former Oregon statute attempted to balance competing interests of 
the employee and employer by mostly “codify[ing] the basic common law 
rules” of reasonableness.36  Oregon courts imposed additional requirements 
for enforcement, tipping the balance in favor of the employee’s interest in 
mobility.  In addition, the Oregon approach built in some degree of judicial 
discretion in recognition that “the variety of employment situations make[s] 
 32. In King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., the court altered the covenant 
because it essentially forced the employee to choose between unemployment and switching 
to an entirely different profession.  Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 972 (discussing King 
v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 866 So. 2d 769 (Ala. 2004)). 
 33. See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 969-73 (noting that the 
reasonableness test rests on the assumption that the employee can bargain with the 
employer). 
 34. Charles A. Carlson & Amy E. Stoll, Business is Business:  Recognizing Referral 
Relationships as Legitimate Business Interests Protectable By Restrictive Covenants in 
Florida, 82 FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (2008) (investigating the legal limits of restrictive covenants in 
Florida). 
 35. See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899-900 (“The validity of the contract in each case . . . 
must be maintained between the interests of the employer and the employee.”). 
 36. Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:  
Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 243 (2007) (discussing statutes pertaining to non-compete 
agreements passed in several jurisdictions). 
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drafting specific limitations impossible.”37 
Oregon statutory law mandated that non-competes in any industry 
were void unless “entered into upon the:  (a) [i]nitial employment of the 
employee with the employer; or (b) [s]ubsequent bona fide advancement of 
the employee with the employer.”38  Oregon courts did not take these 
requirements lightly.  In fact, Oregon courts reiterated that “[u]nder Oregon 
law, the right not to be subjected to a non-competition agreement, except as 
authorized . . . is an ‘important employment-related statutory right.’”39 
For instance, an employee had to receive “good consideration” in 
exchange for signing the agreement.40  Such consideration required that the 
employee had to sign the agreement either in exchange for a subsequent 
bona fide advancement or during the first day of work.41 
Thus, employers who claimed the agreement was signed upon 
initiation of employment had to meet a stringent standard.  Oregon courts 
found that “the language of the statute . . . [was] an unequivocal statement 
of public policy.”42  In fact, “[a]ny non-de minimis delay, between the 
commencement of employment and when the agreement was signed, [was] 
fatal.”43 
The courts also rejected creative arguments meant “to circumvent this 
restriction[, such as] arguing that a new term of employment begins each 
day that an at-will employee comes to work.”44  In these decisions, courts 
noted that an agreement made between an employer and an employee 
differs from “a contract negotiated between two businesses, or an 
independent contractor, who may have greater leeway to establish their 
own terms.”45  Because an employee’s bargaining power may not be as 
powerful as assumed by the traditional common law test, the covenant must 
be signed when the employee has the most power to either walk away from 
a new job or to negotiate the terms of a new job or advancement. 
The requirements for an employer who argued in the alternative, that 
the agreement was signed in exchange for a bona fide agreement, were 
determined by the Ninth Circuit in Nike v. McCarthy “[b]ecause the 
 37. Id. 
 38. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)-(b) (2005) (amended 2007) (listing the 
requirements for a noncompetition agreement under Oregon law). 
 39. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Am Office Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 
(D. Or. 2001) (quoting Dymock v. Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Oregon Indus., Inc., 
172 Or. App. 399, 405-06 (2001)) (expounding the bounds of Oregon noncompetition law). 
 40. Carey, infra note 51, at 143; see also Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1087-88 
(describing a case where an employment competition restraint was held valid in 
consideration of installments of stock paid over the ten-year restraint period). 
 41. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1159-60. 
 42. Konecranes, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1130. 
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Oregon Supreme Court had yet to construe the term” “subsequent bona-
fide agreement.”46  That court found that, while the statutory language did 
not provide guidance, the legislative history showed that a bona fide 
advancement necessitated an increase in responsibility and improvement in 
status, demonstrated by “new, more responsible duties, different reporting 
relationships, and change in title and higher pay.”47  Furthermore, it “held 
that only when all of the elements of the advancement converged could an 
employer obtain a non-compete agreement.”48 
In addition to these statutory requirements, an employer had to meet 
each of the common law safeguards to enforce a covenant.49  The courts 
attributed the harshness of this rule to it being a “covenant in restraint of 
trade,” the enforcement of which generally runs counter to public policy.50 
The first common law requirement was that the agreement mandate 
temporal and geographical limitations.  In its application, Oregon courts 
uniformly held that any agreement spanning over two years was 
unreasonable.51  Furthermore, if the agreement was otherwise enforceable, 
the courts changed unreasonable terms or, if absent, added “reasonably 
limiting terms to contracts which [were] missing temporal or geographical 
restrictive language.”52 
Second, the agreement “must be reasonable, meaning that, ‘it should 
afford only a fair protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it is 
made, and must not be so large in its operation as to interfere with the 
interests of the public.’”53 
 46. Daniel Hutzenbiler, Judicial Review of the Employment Relationship:  An Overview 
of Important Ninth Circuit Employment Law Decisions of 2004, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
551, 567 (2005) (footnote omitted) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Oregon 
law relating to non-compete agreements). 
 47. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 48. Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted). 
 49. Konecranes, Inc. v. Sinclair, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (D.Or. 2004) (citing North 
Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435 (Or. 1976)) (listing the three requirements 
essential to the validity of a contract in restraint of trade). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm:  Emerging Legal Alternatives 
to the Non-Compete Agreement and their Potential Effect on Developing High-Technology 
Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 135, 143 (2001) (explaining the requirements for 
enforcing non-compete clauses in Oregon); see also Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1086 
(noting that courts often “discuss the duration of the . . . agreement . . . in conjunction with 
other variables”). 
 52. Carey, supra note 51, at 143 (footnote omitted); see also Packer & Cleary, supra 
note 1, at 1086-87 (discussing cases in which five-year post-employment contractual 
competition restraints were held unenforceable because they were unreasonable). 
 53. Olsten Corp. v. Sommers, 534 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.Or. 1982) (citation omitted) 
(quoting North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 481, 435 (Or. 1976)) (listing the three 
requirements needed to make a non-competition agreement valid). 
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Just like in traditional common law, the court based its decision on 
notions of fairness where an application of the law did not reach an 
equitable result.  For instance, if an employee signed a non-compete upon 
starting work, the employee could not be held to a different one with the 
same employer, even with a new contract.54  The employer could also be 
estopped from enforcing the covenant if, upon termination and in 
enumerating the employee’s obligations post-employment, the employer 
omitted mention of that agreement.55  Moreover, if an employee signed a 
non-compete with a company that merges with another, then the employee 
is working for, and has no agreement with, a new company.56 
Courts also made a fact-based inquiry to ensure that these agreements 
were enforced only where there was a legitimate business interest.  For 
example, courts were more likely to enforce an agreement restricting use of 
“goodwill and inside information” than “barring a former employee from 
competing altogether.  The latter . . . is contrary to the public interest, and 
makes it difficult for the employee to pursue his livelihood.”57 
B.  Oregon’s New Law 
1. The Political Atmosphere that Birthed Oregon’s New Law 
The Oregon legislature replaced the previous law that was in 
alignment with traditional policy objectives with one that was not.  Why 
would the state legislature implement these changes?  How did it pass this 
new legislation?  Simply put, the law was a product of Oregon’s political 
environment, which made its legislature particularly susceptible to 
compromise labor legislation. 
The Oregon legislature is unique for two reasons.  First, it is not 
saturated with lobbyists.58  Second, the atmosphere is frequently 
characterized as “collegial.”59  As a result, “it doesn’t take that many 
people to get something written [or] changed . . . .  Unfortunately, [the 
Oregon legislature passes] a lot of legislation that isn’t very picked at and 
 54. Pacific Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. White, 696 P.2d 570, 570 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding void a more stringent noncompetition agreement in a third employment contract 
where the first employment contract already contained a noncompetition agreement). 
 55. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62. 
 56. Miller v. Kroger Co., 82 Fed. App’x 557, 559 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a non-
compete agreement negotiated with an employer in contemplation of a merger does not fall 
under the initial employment requirement). 
 57. Konecranes, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
 58. Telephone Interview with Seth Row, Associate, Holland & Knight LLP (Jan. 8, 
2008) [hereinafter Row] (discussing the role of non-compete agreements in Oregon). 
 59. Row, supra note 58. 
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[is subject to] last minutes changes.”60  So, in this case, where strong 
interest groups charged in to make changes to the proposed legislation at 
the last minute, the legislature yielded to their inconsistent demands, and 
produced this n
In addition, there were circumstances that were unique to the time of 
the legislative debate that prompted the introduction of a proposal for a 
new non-compete law.  “Democrats had a majority in both chambers, 
[although] labor [would have] a lower success rate in the Senate than [in] 
the House.”61  In addition, the public was attuned to labor interests.  So, 
representatives were keenly aware that any vote on a bill pertaining to labor 
interests might play a role in their reelection.  Some constituents believed 
that “the ‘special’ interests of unions went arm-in-arm with the wider 
public interest.”62  Others did not look fondly upon unions wielding such 
power and viewed them as unwelcome lobbyists.63  Therefore, “media 
speculation about labor getting whatever it wanted [may have] hurt labor 
because it made some Democrats wary of Republican attack ads that might 
later portray them as union stooges.”64  Thus, the spotlight was on labor 
issues at the time of the bill’s enactment. 
Under the former Oregon law, not many non-compete agreement 
disputes made it to trial in Oregon.  In fact, political players could only 
remember enough to “count them on one hand.”65  The absence of 
litigation, however, did not translate into a lack of controversy. 
Non-competes were “used very widely in situations in which most 
legislatures [and] law professors . . . did not anticipate[,] . . . such as low 
wage people in basically non-competitive industries[, and] in industries 
where changing jobs is common.”66  In addition, there was widespread 
abuse of non-competes both “as a threat to constrain people’s ability to 
change jobs [and against] people that didn’t have the sophistication to 
know that it might not be enforceable to them.”67 
These circumstances caught the eye of Oregon’s Commissioner of 
Labor, Dan Gardner.  What he perceived as an inequitable situation 
 60. Id. 
 61. Don McIntosh, Legislature Bangs Gavel on Banner Year for Oregon Labor, 
NORTHWEST LAB. PRESS, July 6, 2007, at 1, http://www.nwlaborpress.org/2007/7-6-
07Salem.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Monahan, supra note 3; see also Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired!  And Don’t 
Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”:  The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary 
Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (“The law in this area is relatively 
undeveloped, perhaps because so few termination cases have made their way through the 
reported decisions or the courts have not given them much reasoned analysis.”). 
 66. Row, supra note 58. 
 67. Id. 
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motivated him to assume the role of the “driving force behind [the new 
bill].”68  Furthermore, political aspirations may have played a part in 
advocating for this high-profile, labor-friendly position.  The bill would 
also have the effect of rallying support for the Democratic Party.  “The idea 
was that [Gardner] thought it would be a great move forward for the 
Democratic Party in Oregon . . . because [non-compete agreements] are 
viewed as the albatross around the neck of the working man.”69 
The circumstances seemed ideal to pass this legislation.  First, 
Gardner appeared to be a qualified lobbyist.  He “[had] some sway with 
Democrat[ic] leaders in Salem, if only because he served with many of 
them before being elected to the labor commissioner position.”70  Second, 
the timing was right.  In the past, there had been “a couple of 
[unsuccessful] runs earlier in legislative sessions” to restrict these 
covenants.71  Now, however, the neighboring state of California had 
prohibited non-compete agreements, so Gardner believed that he would 
have the momentum to succeed this time.72 
2.  The Development of the New Law 
The bill started as a relatively straightforward prohibition against non-
compete agreements where the employer terminated his employee.  Yet, 
the bill would catch the attention of special interest groups who worried 
about its application, but relished the opportunity to codify into law an 
exception for their industry.73  As a result, the bill grew more complex and 
ineffective as it ping-ponged back and forth between the House and Senate. 
On January 9, 2007, the House voted for House Bill 2257.  The bill 
voided any non-compete agreement if “the employee [was] laid off by the 
employer.”74  Laid off was defined as: 
[P]ermanent termination . . . for reasons that are beyond the 
employee’s control and that do not reflect discredit upon the 
employee [including] . . . . the elimination of the employee’s 
position, a lack of available funding or work, a reduction in the 
size of the workforce and changes in the workplace that affect 
 68. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Non-Compete Bill Appears on Way to Final Passage, WHAT’S HAPPENING AT THE 
OAB?  THE WEEKLY UPDATE FROM YOUR OAB OFFICE, (Oregon Ass’n of Broadcasters, 
Portland, Or.) May 8, 2007, at 6. 
 71. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The role of these special interest groups is further explored in Part III(B)(3) of this 
Comment. 
 74. H.R. 2257, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
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staffing needs.75 
This version carved out an important exception.  Under this bill, 
during an economic downturn, an employer has to effectively pay, in the 
form of the employee’s wages, to protect his investment or release the 
employee from the covenant.  If the situation were otherwise and an 
employer could terminate the employee and still enforce the covenant, an 
employee would face some unappealing choices, such as learn a new skill, 
move, commute outside of the restricted area, or remain unemployed, 
without having committed any wrong.  This amounts to a reasonableness 
test that tips in favor of employee mobility. 
However, this was not the version that was enacted.  On January 12, 
2007, the Senate expanded the definition of being “laid off” to “discharged 
or laid off by the employer for a reason other than misconduct connected 
with work.”76  Gardner advocated this version as a better balance of 
interests than the previous law.  He claimed that enforcement of a covenant 
where the employee was of no further use to an employer in a broad set of 
circumstances was an inequitable restraint on employee mobility.  Gardner 
told one newspaper:  employers “‘didn’t need their services anymore but[,] 
either through legal action or industry action[,] (the noncompetes) are being 
enforced . . . . [T]hese employees] have to go find a job in a different 
industry or move out of the state.’”77  He reassured employers that their 
interests need not be protected by this type of covenant.  Instead, they could 
resort to “federal legislation [that] protects trade secrets and that would not 
be changed by this legislation.”78 
Still, the OAB, representing employers of the broadcasting industry, 
was worried that this bill would not protect their interests.  In particular, it 
was concerned about the meaning of “laid off” on two fronts.  First, the 
OAB anticipated that the ambiguity in the definition would cause a great 
deal of litigation.79  Second, it was wary of getting bogged down in 
litigation over how each former employee departed from employment.  In 
the end, “[t]he OAB reviewed the new bill and determined that the 
broadcast industry could live with the provisions, even though in a perfect 
world, [they believed] non-competes would not be a subject worthy of 
legislative consideration.”80 
 75. Id. at §1(6)(C)(c). 
 76. S. 248, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).  In addition, this bill required that 
the employer either inform the employee of a non-competition agreement when extending 
the job offer or upon a subsequent bona fide advancement.  Id. 
 77. Bills Would Amend Noncompete Agreements For Laid-Off Workers, AP ALERT, 
Apr. 7, 2007. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (“Business interests, though, say [that] the definition of ‘laid off’ in proposed 
legislation is vague.”). 
 80. What’s Happening at the OAB, supra note 70, at 5. 
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While some major unions had yet to get involved at this point, some 
labor lobbyists lent their voice in support of the provision on grounds of 
fairness.81  Yet, others vied for an all-out ban.  The media, sympathizing 
with the employee side, continued to drum up support by recounting 
personal narratives of discharged employees.82 
On May 9, 2007, the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary 
continued to tweak the contents of the bill.  As with past drafts, the 
Committee wanted the covenants to be void “if the employee is laid off by 
the employer for any reason other than just cause.”83   The Committee also 
decided to add more circumstances that would qualify as “laid off”:  an 
employee “is laid off due to an economic downturn” and the “employee is 
not rehired by the employer within 90 days . . . in a position of the same 
level.”84  In addition, if the non-compete agreement did not satisfy all the 
criteria for enforcement, the Committee created an unusual exception.  
Namely, if otherwise enforceable, the court may uphold the agreement “if 
the employer provides the employee full compensation at the level” of the 
job from which he was terminated.85 
In the January 9 bill, an employee in this situation would not be 
characterized as “laid-off” since the employee was not permanently 
terminated.  The January 12 version, permitting enforcement only where 
there was misconduct, expunged that exception.  The May 9 version 
reinstated it, tipping the scales in favor of an employer.  An employer could 
escape having to pay in the form of wages, for a time at least, to enforce the 
covenant during an economic slump. 
The bill’s second change, permitting an employer to pay the 
employee’s wages in order to enforce the agreement, could work for or 
against either party, particularly in the broadcasting industry.  It could be 
argued that an employer would not pay this sum unless he truly wanted to 
protect a business interest.  However, name recognition and fame are 
extremely important in the broadcasting industry.  If an employer were to 
pay this sum and keep a broadcaster off the air, the employer would 
effectively diminish the employee’s good name and, as a result, ruin his 
career.  Additionally, a vindictive employer could destroy the employee’s 
career without a showing of a legitimate business interest.  Regardless of 
 81. Noncompete Agreements, AP ALERT, Apr. 8, 2007 (“[L]abor advocates say such 
clauses are unfair to those who have been laid off against their will.”). 
 82. See, e.g., id. (recounting how a physical therapist found out after she was fired that 
she could not perform similar work within sixty miles); Michael Lloyd, Bruce Womack Sr., 
Laid Off, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 29, 2007, at B1 (recounting how fired store manager 
had to drive forty miles to new job in order to comply with old employer’s non-compete 
agreement). 
 83. S. 248 Amendment, 74th Leg. Assem., (Or. 2007). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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these concerns, this version was not enacted. 
Finally, on June 7, 2007, the Senate Interim Committee drafted the 
version that would become law.  As a preliminary matter, the law states 
that non-competes are voidable and unenforceable in Oregon courts unless 
they satisfy several requirements.86  These requirements were far more 
complicated than any previous version of the bill. 
The first requirement is that the employee cannot be restricted from 
working for more than two years from the date of termination.87  If the 
agreement stipulates a longer duration, “[the agreement] is voidable and 
may not be enforced by a court of this state.”88  Essentially, this provision 
codified the common law already in place, which dictated that any 
restriction over two years, in any factual scenario, was unreasonable. 
Next, the agreement must be entered into in one of two ways:  (1) the 
employer informed the employee, in writing, that a non-compete is 
required two weeks prior to commencement of work; or (2) the employer 
offered a bona fide advancement, which includes both a raise and 
additional responsibility, in return for signing the non-compete.89 
Third, the employee’s annual salary and commissions must be greater 
than the median family income for a four-person family, as determined by 
the United States Census Bureau.90  Currently, that figure is about 
$62,000.91 
Additionally, the employee must possess certain qualities.92  The 
employee must:  “[perform] predominantly intellectual, managerial or 
creative tasks; [exercise] discretion and independent judgment . . . [earn] 
more than $650 per month on a salary basis . . . [and be] employed by the 
United States.”93 
Likewise, there are requirements for the employer.  Specifically, an 
employer must have a protectable interest.94  Ordinarily, a protectable 
interest is one of two things.  First, it could be a trade secret.95  Second, it 
could be “confidential business or professional information that otherwise 
would not qualify as a trade secret, including product development plans, 
product launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans.”96  Courts have a 
 86. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1) (2007). 
 87. Id. at § 653.295(2). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at § 653.295(1)(a)(A)-(B). 
 90. Id. at § 653.295(1)(d). 
 91. Richard Hunt, Commentary:  New Non-Compete Rules Not Entirely Problematic, 
DAILY J. OF COM., Jan. 18, 2007. 
 92. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(b) (2007). 
 93. Id. at § 653.020(3). 
 94. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c). 
 95. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(A). 
 96. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(B). 
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longstanding history of protecting these types of secrets.  Yet, the statute 
also extended the definition to the context of broadcasting.  In this type of 
workplace, an employer has a protectable interest if:  (1) the employee 
works as on-air talent; and (2) the employer spends at least ten percent “of 
the employee’s annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly 
promote the employee . . . on media that the employer does not own or 
control.”97  Yet, the broadcasting employer still cannot enforce a 
protectable interest unless, when the employee is not permitted to work, the 
employer pays the employee “the greater of compensation equal to at least 
50 percent of the employee’s annual gross base salary and commissions at 
the time of the employee’s termination or 50 percent of the median family 
income for a four-person family, as determined by the United States 
Census Bureau . . . .”98 
Finally, the statute included a catch-all provision.  If the four-person 
family salary and employee characteristic requirements are met, the 
employer can enforce the covenant if, when the employee is restricted from 
working, the employer pays the employee the greater of half of his salary 
or half of a four-person family income.99 
The projected effects of this law on broadcasting employers and 
employees are explored later in this Comment.  However, the public 
reaction to the law was that it was not sympathetic enough to the plight of 
employees.  The media peppered the news with poignant narratives of 
broadcasters and of electricians.  The electricians were not, under 
traditional common law, intended to be covered by these agreements.100  In 
the most biting of articles, the media characterized the support behind the 
bill as a “backlash . . . with critics accusing employers of abusing the 
agreements and pursuing complaints against workers who have little to do 
with intellectual property or who didn’t leave voluntarily.”101 
Notwithstanding public sentiments or the imperfections of the original 
statute, the legislature changed a simple law which was easy to understand, 
rooted in tradition, and tested over time to something incoherent.  As 
demonstrated below, the legislature permitted interest groups to steer the 
formation of a new law.  These changes resulted in a statute rampant with 
requirements that fail to further any policy objectives. 
 97. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(i). 
 98. OR. REV. STAT. at § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(ii). 
 99. Id. at § 653.295(6). 
 100. Brent Hunsberger, Noncompete Clause Filters Down from Executive Suite, SEATTLE 
TIMES, June 24, 2007, at F3. 
 101. Id. 
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3.  The Interest Groups that Shaped the Development of the Law 
Gardner’s original proposal only derogated from the law in that it 
carved out an exception that would void the agreement if the employee was 
“laid off.”102  Therefore, his version protected a class of employees based 
on their manner of parting with their former employer (as opposed to their 
salary), the terms of enforcement of the restraint, the existence of a 
protectable interest, and so forth.  His bill was specifically targeted to 
protect employees whose employer no longer wanted to have the employee 
in his staff but did not want to permit the employee to work elsewhere.103 
This exception resonated with the common law tradition of enforcing 
these agreements only when an employer had a protectable business 
interest.  If an employer did not find this employee valuable anymore and 
terminated him or her, then this was an indication of a lack of an interest.  
In addition, this bill could reduce abuse of non-competition agreements.  
Employers in Oregon were issuing unenforceable non-compete agreements, 
and employees who were unfamiliar with the law were binding themselves 
to its terms to their detriment.104  It would be easy to educate employees 
about this clear-cut exception.  In addition, codification of this bill seemed 
feasible because the sympathetic narratives of terminated employees tended 
to garner a lot of support from, and “[struck] a chord with[,] a lot of 
legislatures.”105 
However, any potential for an easy implementation of the bill 
dissipated as interest groups stepped into the mix.  The bill was an 
opportunity to advance not only local, but also national broadcasting and 
technology industry interests on both the managerial and employment side.  
In addition, on a local level, major advocates for the law “came from the . . 
. electricians’ unions that were very frustrated at having non-exempt hourly 
employees subject to them in an area where changing jobs was common 
and didn’t think employers had a protectable interest.”106 
a.  The High-Tech Industry 
On a national level, technology firms worried that the abolition of 
non-compete agreements in California would start a national trend.  It was 
possible that a slippery slope of prohibition would gain momentum in the 
 102. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 103. Telephone Interview with Thomas Carpenter, General Counsel and National 
Director of Legislative Affairs, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, in 
New York, N.Y. (Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Carpenter]. 
 104. Gruntled Employees, http://www.gruntledemployees.com (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
 105. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
 106. Row, supra note 58. 
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Oregon legislature, which greatly influenced by that of California.107  Less 
established businesses were in favor of such a trend.  “[S]tart-up companies 
wanted to make it more difficult to enforce a non-compete because they 
had trouble luring people away from big companies . . . .”108  They 
perceived the covenants as an undue, artificial restraint on the high 
employee mobility of the high tech market.109  In support of a ban, they 
also pointed to the success of the Silicon Valley technology industry that 
followed:  “[the law] enable[d] employees to move more freely from firm 
to firm and thus enhance[d] the likelihood of ‘spill over’ knowledge being 
transmitted from firm to firm, with an overall net benefit to high tech 
industries in the region.”110 
On the flip side, technology firms, such as the American Electronics 
Association, were concerned that if every employee that was “laid off”111 
could escape a non-compete agreement, they would lose their trade secrets 
to competitors.112  They argued that while the industry as a whole appeared 
to be thriving, individual companies were suffering.  As Kristina L. Carey 
observed in her article, “‘[p]rofitability turns less and less on building a 
better mousetrap and more and more on formulating and protecting better 
ideas, namely trade secrets.’”113 
Thus, legislative representatives in Oregon had to evaluate the impact 
of a new non-compete law on the technology industry.  In this process, they 
had to decide whether to value the aggregate industry or “the success or 
survival of the companies which make up the market.”114 
The final version of the new Oregon law did not derogate, in many 
respects, from the previous regime governing non-compete agreements in 
the high-tech industry.  However, the involvement of these technology 
 107. See IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Am. Office Prod., Inc., 178 F. Supp.2d 1154, 
1160 n.5 (D. Or. 2001) (citing California public policy in support of judicial reluctance to 
enforce non-compete agreements). See generally Changes to Oregon’s Employment Laws 
Leave Employers Asking:  Is Oregon the New California?, The Pacific N.W. Employer 
(Jackson Lewis LLP, White Plains, N.Y.), Winter 2008, at 2, 3, available at 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/newsletters/pdf/209.pdf (stating that while 
Oregon’s legislation appears to enact sweeping changes, carefully crafted agreements 
remain enforceable). 
 108. Row, supra note 58. 
 109. Schaller, supra note 5, at 25. 
 110. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted). 
 111. Monahan, supra note 3 (noting that high-tech companies were concerned about the 
definition of the term “laid off”). 
 112. At Work, http://www.blog.oregonlive.com/atwork (last visited Mar. 5, 2007). 
 113. Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm:  Emerging Legal Alternatives 
to the Non-Compete Agreement and Their Potential Effect on Developing High-Technology 
Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 135, 136 (2001) (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting John H. Matheson, Employee Beware:  The Irreparable Damage of the 
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 145 (1998)). 
 114. Id. at 137. 
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firms drew media attention to the bill, attracting more interest groups that, 
in turn, shaped the resultant law.115 
b. The Broadcasting Industry 
Gardner’s bill “did not start out targeted at broadcasters—it was 
silent.”116  That was surprising since, in Oregon, “the local media is very 
prized.”117  Also surprising was that non-compete agreements still 
flourished in the industry with “considerably broader and longer 
restrictions” than in other industries.118  In fact, efforts to ban them by the 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) had failed 
in the past. 
For instance, years before, “a small group of broadcasters in Oregon 
had caught wind of a general law on non-competes that was flowing 
through the legislature that wasn’t very specific to this industry.  AFTRA 
had developed model legislation that had been adopted in several other 
states.”119  The model legislation included a prohibition of non-compete 
agreements between a broadcasting employer and an employee, aside from 
those in sales and management.120  The Oregon legislature, however, did 
not incorporate AFTRA’s text into the law. 
So, when news arrived of Gardner’s bill, the OAB pounced on the 
opportunity to squash any further efforts to ban non-compete agreements in 
the industry.  The OAB “approached Mr. Gardner and [found that] he was 
wholly unfamiliar” with the potential repercussions of the bill on the 
broadcasting industry.121 
The OAB tried to convince Gardner to exempt the broadcasting 
industry from the restriction on non-compete agreements.  The OAB 
argued that:  (1) the broadcasting industry makes these broadcasters famous 
by investing large sums of money in advertising and “should be able to 
protect that investment;” and (2) broadcasters “make a lot of money, 
they’re on T.V., . . . and therefore they don’t deserve the same type of 
protections as those making middle income salary.”122  In other words, the 
 115. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Row, supra note 58 (“[T]he state loves their local news out there . . . . In Oregon 
more so than other places.”). 
 118. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1075. 
 119. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
 120. Email from Thomas Carpenter, General Counsel and National Director of 
Legislative Affairs, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Jan. 29, 2008, 
11:12 EST) (on file with author) (attaching the Broadcast Employment Free Market Act) 
[hereinafter Carpenter Email]. 
 121. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 122. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
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OAB argued that employers had a legitimate business interest and 
employees have sufficient bargaining power. 
When it became clear that a complete exemption had not garnered 
enough support in the legislature, the OAB opposed any suggestion of a 
salary floor for enforcement against broadcasters.  What “bothered them 
the most was that the non-compete clause was only going to be available if 
they were paying the individual in excess” of the average salary, aside from 
the relatively larger Portland, Eugene, Medford, and Bend markets.123  In 
short, the OAB perceived the salary floor as an effective ban on non-
compete agreements. 
After listening to their concerns, Mr. Gardner “wanted to make a 
compromise that would exclude [broadcasting employers] from the 
threshold income requirement provided that they were to invest [the 
equivalent of] ten percent of their [employee’s] salary into promotion.”124  
Gardner’s suggestion was mostly well-received.125 
This new “bill had surfaced before [AFTRA was] even able to . . . 
weigh in on it and the OAB was already mobilized.”126  In fact, Thomas 
Carpenter, the AFTRA National Director of News and Broadcast, 
commented: 
[B]y the time [AFTRA] got involved, it was pretty much a done 
deal.  The bill [had] caught [AFTRA] off-guard and by surprise.  
In any other situation, [AFTRA] would have pulled [the] bill and 
advocated model legislation but [its] local people were asleep at 
the switch and [instead, AFTRA] got caught with a bill that 
would have been damaging.127 
AFTRA immediately “coordinated with other groups and tried to 
intervene to the extent that [it] could.”128  It worked to avoid what their 
model legislation was designed to prevent:  a compromise that would do 
more harm than good.  Often these statutory compromises are comprised of 
a salary cap, a termination exemption, and promotion as consideration.129  
Carpenter explained:  “it makes for bad policy to agree to these 
compromises.  We find where we make compromises to a model language 
it hurts other jurisdictions.”130  Without any choice but to compromise, 
AFTRA sought to ensure that employees in “the most egregious” 
 123. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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circumstances were afforded protection.131 
AFTRA presented its key arguments in support of its contention that 
broadcasters were in a unique situation where enforcement of these 
agreements would be illegal and counter to public policy.  First, it 
purported that broadcasters did not have the bargaining power, an 
underlying concern in traditional non-compete laws, to negotiate these 
agreements.  This was a result of the small number of both available on-air 
broadcasting positions132 and employers in the industry.133  The number of 
employers shrank further after the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the 
Federal Communications Commission’s rules.134 
As a result, the covenants impose an “artificial ceiling on wages” 
because, when renegotiating an expiring contract, broadcasters must decide 
to accept lower wages, remain unemployed until the non-compete expires, 
relocate outside of the designated area, or switch to an entirely new 
career.135  In contrast, those who do have bargaining power, like major 
network broadcasters, do not have non-compete agreements.136 
Furthermore, unlike other industries, there is no employer interest 
because a broadcaster is not privy to trade secrets or confidential 
information.137  Carpenter explained:  “Our fundamental argument is these 
people are not scientists with access to a secret formula or salespeople with 
a secret customer’s list . . . .”138  Instead, broadcasters offer their own 
voice—which is not attributable to an employer’s investment.139 
AFTRA also characterized the employer’s advertising expenses of on-
air talent, not as an investment in training, but “simply a cost of doing 
business.”140  A manager’s investment rationale also lacks substance when 
referring to employees who they do not publicize, like producers.141  In 
addition, “an employee's personality may have become popular for reasons 
other than the employer’s advertising efforts.”142  For instance, 
broadcasters often exert great effort promoting themselves in public arenas 
in order to become well-known enough to get an on-air position in the fi
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Cristin T. Kist, Comment, Blocked Airwaves:  Using Legislation to Make Non-
Compete Clauses Unenforceable in the Broadcast Industry and the Potential Effects of 
ILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 395 (2006). 
penter Email, supra note 120. 
penter, supra note 103. 
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 133. Car
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 142. Kist, supra note 132, at 395. 
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Even when provisions in a non-compete agreement go are unlawfully 
restrictive, an employee may not have the money or the time to fight 
against enforcement because litigation may take longer than the span of the 
non-compete.144  Finally, AFTRA argued that Oregon should fo
dictions, like California, that have banned non-competes. 145 
While AFTRA lobbied, it directed most of its time and effort toward 
convincing one man, Senator Metsger, to lobby for the cause.  He would 
represent them in the legislative debate, but this was late in the game, and 
the last-minute changes to 
At the time AFTRA became involved, the Senate had already passed 
the original version of the bill, which “did not provide a carve-out for 
broadcasting.”146  Then, in the House, the “OAB came in and . . . carved it 
out as an exception” for the broadcasting industry.147  That draft was 
already submitted to two committees for consideration, and was on its way 
to a joint committee 149
t, AFTRA stepped in. 
Senator Metsger, who had only been involved in the amendments for 
five days, sat on the joint committee.  However, Metsger had personal 
knowledge about the effects of a non-compete agreement on a broadcaster 
because he had previously worked as an on-air broadcaster for KION-TV 
in Portland and for a radio station.150  Approximately three years into his 
employment, an employer had asked him to sign a non-compete 
agreement.151  While he was not prohibited from working, Metsger, who 
began his own communications business, believed the covenant was a 
“limiting factor” in his career possibilities.152  Still, others perceived 
Metsger as someone who believed that “he was v
 143. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1098 (citations omitted) (noting that in some 
cases a court does not enforce covenants because “the court suspected that the employee 
became successful through his or her own talents and efforts, not through the employer’s 
penter, supra note 103. 
 State Senator, D-Mt. Hood District 
ger]. 
ra note 3. 
sger, supra note 146. 
efforts”). 
 144. Car
 145. Id. 
 146. Telephone Interview with Rick Metsger, Oregon
26 (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Mets
 147. Metsger, supra note 146. 
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 150. Id.; see also Monahan, sup
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s ago . . . and that was a sore point for him.”153 
Metsger understood the development of non-compete agreements in 
the industry.  He contended that the use of these covenants expanded 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, because the news industry had recently 
“discovered they could make money from [the news].”154  Prior to that, 
news was something they “had to do” as a public service.155  Metsger 
observed that covenants in the broadcasting industry became a standard 
practice.156  In his opinion, “the real injustice” was when an employer did 
not desire to employ the individual (and so either did not renew the 
employee’s contract or terminated him) but restricted his employment 
nonetheless.157  He believed that the widespread agreement in academia158 
supported his conclusion that this was an abuse of covenants.  In support of 
this contention, Metsger stated:  “it’s really hard to make a case that [an 
employee hired elsewhere] is really injurious to the employer and basically 
keeping [the employee] out of [his] profession.”159  Metsger believed that 
because the broadcasting company insisted that there are many others who 
would take the job position, he had felt “forced . . . to sign 
hreatening you with your career either now or later.”160 
AFTRA believed Metsger would be an ideal advocate for their cause.  
A few years before, Metsger had tried to restrict the use of non-competes 
but  
When AFTRA contacted Metsger, he offered his support.162  
However, their interests were not completely aligned.163  Metsger’s only 
goal was to make sure that an employer could not enforce a non-compete 
clause unless the employer compensated the employee.164  Advocates for 
the broadcasting industry were perturbed that Metsger “intervened at the 
eleventh hour” to try to outlaw non-competes altogether.165  Metsger 
disagreed with that characterization:  “I forced the issue a
 153. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 154. Metsger, supra note 146. 
 155. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 employee and prevent him from 
) (emphasis omitted). 
sger, supra note 146. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Vanko, supra note 65, at 1 (“Strict considerations of fairness suggest that 
it is antithetical to allow an employer to terminate an
working in his chosen profession.”
 159. Met
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Monahan, supra note 3. 
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thout addressing this issue, especially since there 
were
ir talent in the [Oregon] 
broa
ng off track.  I was willing to 
comp
sger, by adding “goofy percentages,” became just 
another participant who made “too many changes” to the law, stripping it 
IV.  
 
in restoring/basically taking that exception back out.” 166 
This success was not without struggle.  Greg Macpherson, the 
judiciary chair of the House, put the broadcasting exception in and “lobbied 
[Metsger] hard because [he believed] it wouldn’t pass otherwise and 
[Metsger] said bologna.”167  Metsger cast aside Macpherson’s opinion that, 
without this exception, the bill would fail.168  Instead, Metsger believed that 
the law would be unfair wi
 other “legal shackles” to protect employers, such as laws pertaining to 
propriety information.”169 
As a result, Metsger “derailed the bill by moving not to concur 
sending the bill to a joint House-Senate conference committee to deal with 
provisions specifically related to the broadcast industry.”170  The 
conference produced a bill that mandated that employers pay half of an 
employee’s salary while the employee was restricted from working for a 
competitor.  Although this may be characterized as a compromise, it 
“effectively put a stop on non-competes with on-a
dcasting industry.”171  Yet, this version had a more robust vote from 
the house and senate than before this exception.172 
Not everyone was pleased with the outcome.  AFTRA wanted to start 
from scratch, but believed “[t]his was the best [they] could do.173  Metsger, 
too, believed that a completely new bill would have threatened any 
protection that this law provided; likewise, he preferred the confusing 
language of this law.  Metsger explained:  “when you make too many 
changes [to a bill], [you] risk at getti
romise with any of their goofy percentages in order to make sure 
[broadcasters] were broadly covered.”174 
Ironically, Met
of its effectiveness. 
EFFECTS OF LAW 
Aside from the timing requirements that were already in place, the 
 
 166. Metsger, supra note 146. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (recounting that Macpherson advocated the position that it was better to “get 
ninety-five percent of the apple rather than lose the whole apple”). 
 169. Metsger, supra note 146. 
 170. Conkling Fiskum & McCormick, Non-compete Bill Hits Snag, Bounces Back (June 
26, 2007), http://www.cfm-online.com/pu_articleprintable.cfm?ArticleID=1211. 
 171. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 172. Metsger, supra note 146. 
 173. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
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employee with the covenant on the 
first 
wer in the West.”   
As o
 is “no incentive for employers” to pay other 
 
new law did not meet, let alone balance, the interests of employers and 
employees in the broadcasting industry.  Admittedly, the new law did help 
codify the common law already in place.  For example, it said that a 
covenant not to compete spanning over two years is void, and that the 
agreement must be entered upon commencement of employment or along 
with a bona fide advancement.175  Unlike the former Oregon law, a new 
employee must now learn of the agreement two weeks prior to starting 
employment.  This boosts an employee’s bargaining power because an 
employer can no longer surprise a new 
day of work.  Of course, this does infringe upon an employer’s interest 
because the employer, who may need help immediately, must wait two 
weeks for the employee to begin work. 
The Oregon law that is now in effect also prohibits enforcement of 
non-compete agreements against employees making the median family 
income for a four-person family,176 which is approximately $62,000.177  As 
of 2007, median news salaries nationwide did not reach that level.  The 
national median news salaries in television are:  $60,000 for news anchors; 
$53,300 dollars for weathercasters; $40,000 for sports anchors; $29,500  
for news reporters; and $29,000 for sports reporters.178  Compared to 
Oregon figures, these numbers may be inflated due to the fact that 
“[o]verall, salaries are highest in the Northeast and lo 179
f 2007, the median salaries in radio broadcasting are also below the 
threshold:  $25,000 for news reporters; $29,000 for news anchors; $30,000 
for sports anchors; and $19,300 for sports reporters.180 
There are two potential consequences of this requirement, both of 
which are detrimental to at least one side of the broadcasting industry.  
First, this could serve as an effective ban on non-compete agreements for 
the majority of employees earning below this amount.  Employers clearly 
are not amenable to this result.  Secondly, the salary minimum may act as a 
ceiling on wages for those earning above that figure, which is detrimental 
to employees.  The floor would then “essentially [be] putting a situation in 
play where employers are still not going to pay employees fair value for 
their services”; in short, there
 
 175. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)-(b),(2) (2008). 
295(1)(d) (2008). 
lable at  
t rtnda.org/media/pdfs/communicator/2007/jun/062007-16-25.pdf. 
cern that 
st five years are only 40 percent of inflation”). 
 176. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.
 177. Hunt, supra note 91. 
 178. Bob Papper, Seize the Pay:  As Newsroom Compensation Chases Inflation, Not 
Everyone Is Able to Catch Up, According to the Latest RTNDA/Ball State University Survey, 
COMMUNICATOR, June 2007, at 16-17, avai
h tp://www.
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.; see also id. at 22 (stating how broadcasters have voiced additional con
“radio salary increases during the pa
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oyees more than that low floor.181  Furthermore, a salary requirement 
does not indicate, at least in common law tradition, that the employer has a 
protectable business interest. 
The next prerequisite for enforcement of the covenants is that the 
employee must conduct “administrative, executive or professional work[;] . 
. . [p]erform[] predominantly intellectual, managerial or creative tasks; 
[and] [e]xercise[] discretion and independent judgment.”182  While 
employees that perform on-air are explicitly included in the statute, the 
elusive language does not give guidance as to who else in the industry can 
be subjected to an agreement.  For instance, are producers performing 
“creative” work?  How far down the chain of production does the statute 
apply, considering that many 
 will create uncertainty in the industry because even employees and 
employers who are knowledgeable about their legal rights will have 
difficulty entangling this mess. 
The statute also stipulates that an employer has a protectable interest 
in the employee, meaning that the employer spends money training or 
advertising the broadcaster in media not owned by the employer, and the 
employee works as on-air talent.183  Employee interests are not met here 
because neither advertising expenses nor training (such as public speaking 
classes) necessarily gives rise to a legitimate protectable interest, like a 
trade secret, under traditional common law.  Moreover, non-compete 
agreements are only intended for situations where the employee poses a 
real threat to an employer’s business by potentially bringing secrets to a 
competitor.  Neithe
dition, the employer actually benefits from the additional advertising 
expenses, further indicating that it does not give the employee additional 
bargaining power. 
Next, the employer must pay the employee greater than half of the 
employee’s salary or the minimum income during the period that the 
employee is forbidden from working.184  In fact, if some of the 
requirements are not met, but (1) the employee still earns the minimum 
income and performs a job of certain characteristics, and (2) the employer 
is willing to pay that same amount while the covenant is enforced, 
ment is valid.185  Like the minimum salary, this will either serve as a 
salary cap or as an effective ban on these covenants “because employers 
won’t want to pay them” while they are restricted from employment.186 
 181. Carpenter, supra note 103. 
 182. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.020(3) (2008). 
 183. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(i) (2008). 
 184. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(ii) (2008). 
 185. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(6) (2008). 
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Combined, these requirements are complicated and neither employees 
nor employers will be able to predict, with certainty, whether they are 
unenforceable.  Non-compete agreements, both enforceable and 
unenforceable, were prevalent in 2007.187  In that year, the number of non-
compete agreements dropped from previous years, although it is uncertain 
whether this decline will continue into the future.188  Even so, the covenants 
are still prevalent in the television industry:  89.7% of sports anchors, 
89.3% of weathercasters, and 91.5% of news reporters are subject to a non-
compete agreement.189  The figures for radio are also high-90% of news 
reporters, 70.6% of news anchors, 75% of sports anchors, and 100% of 
sports reporters are under a non-compete agreement.190  These statistics 
reflect the belief that, unlike the management side of the industry, many 
employees do not know that their agreement may be unenforceable.191  The 
complex nature of the new law increases the likelihood that employees w
 difficulty discerning their rights and assessing their bargaining power.  
In addition, given the lack of litigation over these agreements, it is likely 
that employees will not challenge an unlawful non-compete agreement. 
Employers will suffer from this uncertainty too.  Aside from its effects 
on salary, the uncertainty of th
gst companies that you can’t take non-competes for granted [even if 
they are within the bounds of the law because there are] so many ways to 
challenge and get out of them.”192 
Following the law’s enactment, companies are trying to adjust in a 
number of ways.  Beginning in 2008, companies will enter into agreements 
two weeks prior to an employee’s start date.193  In addition, companies may 
be resorting to other types of agreements covering trade secrets194 and 
solicitation.  However, these contracts may not be sufficient to please 
employers.  For instance, while some attorneys are turning to non-
solicitation agreements for employees with lower wages, “there has to be a 
great deal of legislation before [the legal community] understand[s] it.”195  
The ambiguo
ment is drafted “broadly so a court can construe it as a non-compete, 
 
 187. Papper, supra note 178, at 24. 
n-compete agreement with their employer was unenforceable). 
g the California technology industry’s transition to 
ed on trade secret law). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Row, supra note 58 (discussing the common problem of employees not knowing 
that their no
 192. Id. 
 193. Monahan, supra note 3. 
 194. Row, supra note 58 (discussin
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months of 
the contract, an employee will not talk to a competitor and will give his 
e first opportunity to reach an agreement).197 
V.  
y for that matter; it should be a 
thoughtful attempt to aid both employers and employees, and in the 
process, help the industry thrive. 
 
 
customers.196 
Meanwhile, unions are pushing employers to adopt other “less 
onerous means” to keep employees that do not “create unemployment or 
compress salaries,” including paying what the market will bear for their 
services (if that anchor is truly a valued employee); long term contracts; 
contracts that have first negotiation rights (e.g., during last six 
current employer th
CONCLUSION 
Non-compete agreements have a longstanding history—one that 
clearly conveys the purpose of these covenants.  The enforcement of non-
compete agreements is limited to protecting a legitimate business interest, 
but only when an employee’s mobility is not unduly burdened.  However, 
this new Oregon law does not balance these interests.  Instead, the law, a 
conglomeration of advocated requirements by interest groups, will be 
detrimental to the broadcasting industry by affecting salaries, increasing 
uncertainty in the law, and enforcing non-competes based on arbitrary 
requirements rather than sound policy.  Hopefully, this article will compel 
the Oregon legislature to revisit this issue.  After all, a non-compete law 
should not just have the effect of placing burdensome restrictions on the 
broadcasting industry, or any industr
 196. Id. 
 197. Carpenter, supra note 103 (discussing routes an employer can take that provide 
similar protections to a non-compete agreement yet reduce the burden on an employee). 
